Introduction
The separate and dissenting opinions and declarations of the judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Arrest Warrant 1 invite discussion of what is meant by 'universal jurisdiction'. This article suggests that the respective judges' understanding of the concept is debatable, since underlying it is a tendency, when dealing with states' criminal jurisdiction, to elide prescription and enforcement, as 2 The S. S. Lotus (France v Turkey), 1928 PCIJ Series A, No. 10. 3 Prescription by judicial ruling occurs most commonly when a court interprets the scope of a statutory offence in such a manner as to extend that scope. In addition, in some common-law countries, certain crimes and their jurisdictional scope are still the creatures of the judge-made law alone. See infra note 23 for more.
well as an inattention to the question of when the requisite prescriptive jurisdictional nexus must be present. A number of the resulting judicial statements -eagerly looked to as the first by the World Court on national criminal jurisdiction since the Lotus case, 2 over 70 years before -serve, it is argued, as questionable guides to one of international law's more controversial topics. The various judgments promote regrettable terminology. Moreover, the elision and inattention cited above lead some judges to a contestable finding on the lawfulness of the enforcement in absentia of universal jurisdiction, and causes others to underestimate the degree of state practice that exists in support of universal jurisdiction over crimes under general international law.
This article first outlines the basic principles of public international law governing national criminal jurisdiction and then, in this light, highlights and comments on the treatment of jurisdictional issues, especially universal jurisdiction, in the separate and dissenting opinions and declarations in Arrest Warrant.
International Principles Governing National Criminal Jurisdiction
A state's 'jurisdiction', in the present context, refers to its authority under international law to regulate the conduct of persons, natural and legal, and to regulate property in accordance with its municipal law. Jurisdiction can be civil or criminal. Only criminal jurisdiction will be discussed here and, as such, only the regulation of the conduct of persons will be considered. Jurisdiction is not a unitary concept. On the contrary, both the longstanding practice of states and doctrinal writings make it clear that jurisdiction must be considered in its two distinct aspects, viz. jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. Jurisdiction to prescribe or prescriptive jurisdiction -sometimes called 'legislative' jurisdiction -refers, in the criminal context, to a state's authority under international law to assert the applicability of its criminal law to given conduct, whether by primary or subordinate legislation, executive decree or, in certain circumstances, judicial ruling. 3 Jurisdiction to enforce or enforcement jurisdictionsometimes called 'executive' jurisdiction -refers to a state's authority under international law actually to apply its criminal law, through police and other executive action, and through the courts. More simply, jurisdiction to prescribe refers to a state's authority to criminalize given conduct, jurisdiction to enforce the authority, inter alia, to arrest and detain, to prosecute, try and sentence, and to punish 4 See, similarly, P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public (Nguyen Quoc Dinh) (6th edn, Paris:
LGDJ, 1999), § § 334 and 336, respectively, drawing a distinction between 'compétence normative' and 'compétence d'exécution', i.e. 'une distinction entre l'édiction d'une règlementation (au sens large) . . . et son application': 'Par contraste avec la compétence normative, qui consiste en l'édiction de normes générales et impersonelles ou décisions individuelles par les organs investis de la function législative ou règlementaire, la compétence d'exécution "s'etend généralement comme le pouvoir d'accomplir des actes matériels tels la détention, l'instruction ou le redressement de la violation d'une règle de droit"'. 5 See, e.g. Restatement (Third) Note, in this regard, the seemingly universal practice whereby a state's criminal courts -in contrast usually to its civil courts -apply the law of that state and no other.
persons for the commission of acts so criminalized. 4 Universal jurisdiction, it should be stressed from the outset, is a species of jurisdiction to prescribe.
Separate reference is sometimes made, especially in the civil context, to 'jurisdiction to adjudicate ', 5 or 'judicial' 6 or 'curial' 7 jurisdiction, referring specifically to a municipal court's competence under international law to adjudge certain matters. But, in the criminal context, the distinction is generally unnecessary. The application of a state's criminal law by its criminal courts is simply the exercise or actualization of prescription: both amount to an assertion that the law in question is applicable to the relevant conduct.
8 As a result, a state's criminal courts have no greater authority under international law to adjudge conduct by reference to that state's criminal law 9 than has the legislature of the state to prohibit the conduct in the first place. Equally, the trial and, in the event, conviction and sentencing of an individual for conduct prohibited by a state's criminal law is as much a means of executing or enforcing that law as is the police's investigation, arrest, charging and prosecution of the individual under it. As such, a state's criminal courts have no greater authority under international law to execute the state's criminal law than have the police or other coercive organs and agents of that state: as will be seen below, neither can operate as of right in the territory of another state. In apparent recognition of the foregoing, the respective judges of the ICJ In the final analysis, it arguably does not matter whether the so-called 'Lotus presumption', in general or in the specific context of criminal jurisdiction, is correct or accepted in principle, since, in practice, its application need not run counter to the observable situation whereby state assertions of prescriptive criminal jurisdiction are tolerated only if they fall under specific acceptable heads: all that is required is that, instead of characterizing the accepted heads of prescriptive jurisdiction as permissive rules set against a backdrop of a general prohibition, we think of them as pockets of residual presumptive permission in the interstices of specific prohibitions. The only difference -and this might not, in the event, be that great -is the burden of proof.
As it is, the Court in Lotus summarized its position very generally, stating that 'all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty': Lotus, at 19. This simple statement is unimpeachable and '[w]hatever the underlying conceptual approach, a State must be able to identify a sufficient nexus between itself and the object of its assertion of jurisdiction': Oxman, supra note 6, at 56. On a different note, it is worth stating that, as a matter of general international law (cf. certain treaty obligations), jurisdiction to prescribe is permissive or facultative, not mandatory. Whether or not a state actually asserts a jurisdiction allowed it by international law is a matter for that state.
bulk of the mainstream European academic literature 10 premise their respective treatments of national criminal jurisdiction on the simple binary distinction between what are, here, termed jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.
As specifically regards jurisdiction to prescribe, state practice reveals a number of accepted bases or 'heads' of jurisdiction, 11 pursuant to which, as a matter of general international law, states may 12 assert the applicability of their criminal law, each of these heads being thought to evidence a sufficient link between the impugned conduct and the interests of the prescribing state. The two heads of jurisdiction unquestionably 13 In the past, passive personality was sometimes subsumed terminologically into the protective principle:
see, e.g. op. Rezek at § 4. In the past, at least, this principle has been less a general rule than the basis on which a few, specific exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-nationals have been tolerated by states, e.g. the offence of counterfeiting currency or an inchoate conspiracy to assassinate the head of state. 16 The effects doctrine proper is to be distinguished from prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of so-called 'objective' territoriality, out of which it seems to have grown: we speak of the former rather than the latter when no constituent element of the offence takes place within the territory of the prescribing state. The Court in Lotus was content simply to note the occasional assertion of such jurisdiction: see Lotus, at 23. In the event, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of the effects doctrine has proved uncontroversial in relation to certain offences, e.g. inchoate conspiracies to commit murder, to import prohibited drugs, etc. But, to cut a long story short, it has proved highly controversial in other areas, notably in the field of antitrust or competition law, even if today '"[e]ffects" or "impact" jurisdiction is embraced both by the United States and, with certain qualifications, by the European Union' in this area: Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 47. available to states in respect of all offences are territoriality and, in relation to extraterritorial offences, nationality: that is, a state may criminalize conduct performed on its territory, as well as conduct performed abroad by one of its nationals. In addition, extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct of non-nationals on the basis of so-called 'passive personality ' -viz. where the victim of the offence is a national of the prescribing state 13 -now appears generally permissible. 14 Extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the conduct of non-nationals is also permitted, although only in relation to certain offences, under what is known as the 'protective' principle (or compétence réelle): that is, states may assert criminal jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by aliens where the offence is deemed to constitute a threat to some fundamental national interest. 15 The assertion of criminal jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by aliens on the basis of the 'effects' doctrine -viz. where the offence is deemed to exert some deleterious effect within the territory of the prescribing state -remains controversial, if apparently not objectionable in all cases.
16 Many states also assert prescriptive criminal jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of non-nationals on a range of other bases thought to evidence a sufficient link with the prescribing state's interests, e.g. on the basis of the offender's residency in that state or his or her service in that state's armed forces. Such assertions have seemingly excited no adverse reaction. Finally, even if the range of such offences is contested, criminal jurisdiction over the extraterritorial conduct of non-nationals also attaches to certain 17 See, e.g specific offences on the basis of universality -that is, in the absence of any other acceptable prescriptive jurisdictional nexus.
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While jurisdiction to prescribe can be extraterritorial, jurisdiction to enforce is, by way of contrast, strictly territorial. A state may not enforce its criminal law in the territory of another state without that state's consent. 18 The territorial character of jurisdiction to enforce is seen most clearly in the impermissibility, as of right, of extraterritorial police powers: the police of one state may not investigate crimes and arrest suspects in the territory of another state without that other state's consent.
19 It is also reflected in the judicial sphere: the criminal courts of one state may not, as of right, sit in the territory of another, 20 or subpoena witnesses or documents, or take sworn affidavit evidence abroad. The upshot of this is that a state's jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal law and its jurisdiction to enforce it do not always go hand in hand. It is often the case that international law permits a state to assert the applicability of its criminal law to given conduct but, because the author of the conduct is abroad, not to enforce it. At the same time, general international law does not prohibit the issuance of an arrest warrant for a suspect or the trial of an accused in 21 See, e.g. Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 56. As regards the trial of the accused, the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in the common-law tradition is, as a matter of municipal law, generally in personam: with a few exceptions, the presence of the accused in the court is a precondition to his or her trial. By contrast, many civil-law states permit trial in absentia under certain conditions. 22 It would seem that, vis-à-vis an injured state within the meaning of Art. 42 absentia, the legality of both being a question for the municipal law of each state. 21 Nor does the territorial character of criminal enforcement jurisdiction prevent the prescribing state from requesting the extradition of a suspect, accused or convict from the territory of a state in which he or she is present, or from requesting other police or judicial assistance from another state.
Jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce are logically independent of each other. The lawfulness of a state's enforcement of its criminal law in any given case has no bearing on the lawfulness of that law's asserted scope of application in the first place, and vice versa. For example, imagine that a criminal court in the state of Hernia tries and convicts a national of the state of Dyspepsia under a Hernian statute outlawing whistling in Dyspepsia, the accused having been arrested while on holiday in Hernia. Hernia is exercising an exorbitant prescriptive jurisdiction, but no rule of international law governing jurisdiction to enforce has been breached. Conversely, imagine that Dyspepsian police arrest, in Hernian territory, a Dyspepsian national, charged with murder in Dyspepsia. This constitutes an exorbitant exercise by Dyspepsia of jurisdiction to enforce, even if it enjoys jurisdiction under international law to criminalize the conduct in question.
At the same time, while jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce are mutually distinct, the act of prescription and the act of enforcement are, in practice, intertwined. A state's assertion of the applicability of its criminal law to given conduct is actualized, as it were, when it is sought to be enforced in a given case. Nonetheless, the act of prescription can still be said to take place when the prohibition in question is promulgated, the conduct prohibited being, at that point, hypothetical (that is, paradigmatic murder, paradigmatic robbery and so on). It might well be that the question of when prescription occurs is distinct from the question of when state responsibility for the arrogation of exorbitant prescriptive jurisdiction can be said to be engaged, although the latter might, in turn, depend upon the way in which responsibility is invoked.
22 But, as far as prescription itself is concerned, this must be 23 The situation is more complex when a state's assertion of the applicability of its criminal law to given conduct takes place by way of judicial ruling. As mentioned supra note 3, this can happen in one of two ways. In the vast majority of cases in both civilian and common-law systems, such a ruling will take the form of an expansive interpretation by the court of the ambiguous jurisdictional scope of a given statute. While the practical effect of such a ruling is that prescription occurs only at the moment of its exercise, the formal legal characterization of the situation is that the statute in question has always had the jurisdictional scope ascribed to it by the court; as such, prescription can still be said, at least in formal terms, to have occurred when the statute came into force. In some common-law countries, however, the jurisdictional scope of at least certain crimes is still the creation solely of the judge-made law, the upshot being that a judicial ruling can (leaving aside certain objections) extend the jurisdictional scope of a crime without reference to statute. Here, recourse must be had to the traditional common-law fiction that a judicial ruling merely 'discovers' what the common law has always been, the result being that, again at least formally, prescription takes place not at the moment of enforcement but when the common law is said, by historical fiction, to have emerged. In both instances, the reality is that serious questions of retroactivity arise: although the prohibition itself might have existed at the time of the accused's conduct, the application of the prohibition to the accused might not have been said to occur when jurisdiction is asserted, rather than exercised. 23 If this were not the case, then the prescription of the prohibition in question -in other words, the proscription of the relevant conduct -would take place after the commission of the prohibited conduct and, as such, would amount to ex post facto criminalization -a phenomenon abhorred by the world's major legal traditions and contrary to international human-rights law.
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This last point helps to answer the question of when the relevant prescriptive jurisdictional nexus -be it territoriality, the nationality or residency of the offender, the nationality of the victim, or the offender's service in the armed forces of the prescribing state -must exist in a given case; and the answer is that the nexus relied on to ground prescriptive jurisdiction over given conduct must exist at the time at which the conduct is performed. This is obvious in relation to territoriality. The assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over an offence that takes place abroad cannot be founded on territoriality simply because the offender subsequently enters the territory of the prescribing state: regardless of how it is enforced, an assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct taking place outside the territory of the prescribing state is an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, for which an alternative legal justification must be found. As Judge Loder noted in his dissenting opinion in Lotus, speaking specifically of jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of territoriality:
. . . a law [cannot] extend in the territory of the State enacting it to an offence committed by a foreigner abroad should the foreigner happen to be in this territory after the commission of the offence, because the guilty act has not been committed within the area subject to the jurisdiction of that State and the subsequent presence of the guilty person cannot have the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the State. 25 Similarly, in respect of nationality, the offender must be a national of the prescribing 26 The question has less chance of arising in relation to the protective principle and the effects doctrine, where the requisite prescriptive jurisdictional nexus -respectively, the threat posed by the relevant conduct to a fundamental interest of the prescribing state and the effect of the relevant conduct within its territory -is, in practice, simply deemed to exist in relation to certain offences such as counterfeiting. But consider the situation where the prescribing state itself did not exist at the time of the commission of the offence; and query the statements in this regard in Attorney-General of Israel v Eichmann, 36 International Law Reports (ILR) 5, at 49-57, especially § § 36-38 (1961, Dist. Ct Jerusalem) and 36 ILR 5, at 304 (1962, Sup. Ct Israel) . 27 That said, it might be countered that the considerations of natural justice underpinning the principle of legality are less compelling in circumstances where individuals have the choice of whether to render themselves liable to punishment for past conduct by subsequently adopting a given nationality or residency, or by subsequently joining the armed forces of a given state. This rebuttal, however, is unsatisfactory when it comes to jurisdiction on the basis of passive personality in cases where the victim acquires the relevant nationality after the commission of the offence. In such cases, the offender is obviously denied fair warning. 28 It is crucial to note that different considerations apply to crimes under general international law, as specifically considered infra. In short, the principle of legality is not violated in cases of municipal retroactivity where the impugned conduct constituted an offence under international law at the time of its commission: see, e.g. Universal Declaration, Art. 11(2); ICCPR, Art. 15(1); ECHR, Art. 7(1), as consonant with customary international law. This is highly relevant to the exercise of universal jurisdiction over crimes under general international law, especially by means of subsequent nationality or subsequent residency jurisdiction, as also discussed infra. state at the moment at which he or she commits the offence. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of residency, passive personality and service in the armed forces of the prescribing state. 26 The reason for this, as alluded to above, is the cardinal principle of the rule of law expressed in the maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of a jurisdictional nexus established subsequent to the commission of the offence is a form of ex post facto criminalization and, therefore, repugnant, in that a substantive national criminal prohibition and its attendant punishment -and not merely a national procedural competence -become applicable to the accused only after the performance of the impugned conduct.
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This last point is worth emphasizing: the exercise by a state of prescriptive jurisdiction in reliance on a jurisdictional nexus not satisfied until after the commission of the 'offence' means that, at the moment of commission, the 'offender' is not prohibited by the law of that state from performing the relevant act; as such, his or her subsequent conviction and punishment for that act under the law of the state in question are violations of the principle of legality. This is especially significant in relation to prescriptive jurisdiction asserted on the basis of a nationality (or, equally, residency) acquired after the impugned act. True, a number of states provide for jurisdiction over certain strictly municipal offences 28 on the basis of nationality acquired by the offender subsequent to the commission of the offence. and cannot be said to be a valid exercise of nationality jurisdiction in the eyes of public international law, 31 even if it has elicited no great reaction from states who do not assert it. The lack of adverse response does not necessarily denote acquiescence. For one thing, while such provisions are on the books, it seems that they have only very rarely formed the basis of prosecutions; as such, there has been little opportunity for the occasioning of injury to other states, 32 and, hence, for protest. Moreover, there is no indication of the opinio juris accompanying the apparent silence, and the most likely explanation for it relates to the admissibility of claims under the law of diplomatic protection: the offender's change of nationality after the commission of the offence implicates the rule on the continuous nationality of claims; alternatively, the offender's later assumption of an additional nationality implicates questions of dual nationality. Whatever other subjective belief as might exist is just as likely political as legal. 
Clarifying Universal Jurisdiction

A. Basic Definition
It comes as something of a surprise that none of the judges in Arrest Warrant explicitly posits a definition of universal jurisdiction, despite the concept's centrality to the case. In fact, Judge ad hoc Van In response to Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, one might fairly question whether treaty or custom could be expected to provide such a definition, rather than just permissive or prohibitive rules regarding a phenomenon defined doctrinally. One might query, also, the genuineness or seriousness of the alleged debate over the meaning of universal jurisdiction. And, one might, with reason, point out that the absence of a customary or conventional definition and the supposed plurality of 37 See, similarly, Reydams, supra note 22, at 5: 'Positively defined, a State exercises universal jurisdiction when it seeks to punish conduct that is totally foreign, ie conduct by and against foreigners, outside its territory and its extensions, and not justified by the need to protect a narrow self-interest. doctrinal definitions do not mean that no single soundest definition of universal jurisdiction cannot be given.
It would seem sufficiently well agreed that universal jurisdiction amounts to the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted jurisdictional nexus at the time of the relevant conduct. (It should again be stressed, in this light, that the term 'universal jurisdiction' is shorthand for 'universal jurisdiction to prescribe' or 'universal prescriptive jurisdiction' and that the point by reference to which one characterizes the head of prescriptive jurisdiction relied on in a given case is the moment of commission of the putative offence.) In positive and slightly pedantic terms, universal jurisdiction can be defined as prescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by persons who, at the time of commission, are non-resident aliens, where such offences are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing state or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects within its territory. 37 This positive definition is, needless to say, a mouthful, and universal jurisdiction is probably more usefully defined in opposition to what it is not. Indeed, Ascensio observes that universal jurisdiction 'is usually defined negatively, as a ground of jurisdiction which does not require any link or nexus with the elected forum'.
38 As stated by de la Pradelle: 43 Other definitions commonly offered are essentially identical, even if they often omit reference to less common heads of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as the protective principle and passive personality. 44 All conceive of universal jurisdiction as permitting a state to deem given conduct an offence against its law, 'regardless of any nexus the state may have with the offen[c]e, the offender, or the victim'. 45 By way of aside, note that universal jurisdiction is often said to mean that 'any' state or 'every' state is permitted to criminalize the conduct in question. 46 While the gist of such statements is clear and obviously correct, the use of words like 'any' and 'every' can be unintentionally misleading, in so far as it might be mistaken to suggest that universal jurisdiction can never be grounded in treaty law, circumscribed as it is by the pacta tertiis principle. Such a misapprehension would seem to underpin Higgins' heterodox characterization (in a non-judicial capacity) of a certain provision common to many international criminal conventions and generally considered to mandate universal jurisdiction. 47 She is not, it must be said, alone. Cameron takes a similar line 48 and Cassese states:
[A]s rightly pointed out by R. Higgins, these treaties do not provide for universal jurisdiction proper, for only the contracting states are entitled to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over offenders on their territory. In addition, it may be contended that such jurisdiction does not extend to offences committed by nationals of states not parties, unless the crime (1) is B. 'Universal Jurisdiction In Absentia'
President Guillaume, Judge Ranjeva and Judge Rezek in Arrest Warrant
The relevant aspect of Arrest Warrant that is most open to question is several judges' treatment of what they call 'universal jurisdiction in absentia', which they posit as some sort of undisaggregated jurisdictional category. For example, President Guillaume -speaking of the jurisdictional provision common to many international criminal conventions, whereby each State Party is obliged to 'take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . . ', 50 without any requirement that the offence should take place on the territory of that state or that the alleged offender or victim should be one of its nationals -notes:
[N]one of these texts has contemplated establishing jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the territory of 53 President Guillaume, after observing that states 'may exercise jurisdiction in cases of piracy and in the situations of subsidiary universal jurisdiction provided for by various conventions if the offender is present on their territory', concludes:
But apart from these cases, international law does not accept universal jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia.
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Judge Ranjeva, noting by way of introduction that 'la présente déclaration portera-t-elle sur l'interprétation que la Belgique donne de la compétence universelle', 55 states:
5. La législation belge qui institue la compétence universelle in absentia pour les violations graves du droit international humanitaire a consacré l'interprétation la plus extensive de cette compétence . . .. L'innovation de la loi belge réside dans la possibilité de l'exercice de la compétence universelle en l'absence de tout lien de la Belgique avec l'objet de l'infraction, la personne de l'auteur présumé de l'infraction ou enfin le territoire pertinent. [L]e for interne de la Belgique n'est pas compétent, dans les circonstances de l'espèce, pour l'action pénale, faute d'une base de compétence autre que le seul principe de la compétence universelle et faute, à l'appui de celui-ci, de la présence de la personne accusée sur le territoire belge, qu'il ne serait pas légitime de forcer à comparaître.
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For her part, Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, while holding contra that 'universal jurisdiction in absentia' is not prohibited by conventional or customary international law, 58 also tends to treat it as a distinct head of jurisdiction, the lawfulness of which is to be proved in its own right; 59 but close reading suggests that this is probably just a function of misplaced emphasis.
It should be noted that the approach taken by President Guillaume and Judges Ranjeva and Rezek is not without resonance in the academic literature. Reydams uses the term 'universal jurisdiction in absentia ', 60 and treats it as a form of jurisdiction whose lawfulness is to be considered in its own right -that is, as distinct from universal jurisdiction per se. 61 In a related vein are the various doctrinal writings summarized by Reydams, 62 where what the author terms the 'co-operative general universality principle' and the 'co-operative limited universality principle' are predicated on the presence of the offender, while the so-called 'unilateral Elsewhere, he distinguishes between 'conditional' universal jurisdiction and 'absolute' universal jurisdiction. 65 
Discussion
The practice of states in this regard -sparse and ambivalent, to date -does not point conclusively to the general recognition of so-called universal jurisdiction in absentia as a distinct category of jurisdiction whose lawfulness is to be established in its own right. As such, the question can only be approached from first principles. In this light, the approach adopted by President Guillaume and Judges Ranjeva and Rezek is not logically compelling. It conflates a state's jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal law with the manner of that law's enforcement. 66 As a manifestation of 'jurisdiction' in some wholly notional unitary sense, there can be no such thing as 'universal jurisdiction in absentia'. Universal jurisdiction is a manifestation of jurisdiction to prescribe. Like all heads of jurisdiction to prescribe, it might be that it is exercised in a given case with the accused present in the court, consequent upon his or her arrest in the territory of the prosecuting state, pursuant to a warrant issued while he or she was present in that territory. Or, it might be exercised in personam, but consequent upon the accused's arrest in and extradition from a foreign state, pursuant to a warrant issued while he or she was abroad or, equally, while he or she was in the territory of the prosecuting state, having since absconded. Alternatively, it might be that it is exercised without the accused present in the court, pursuant to an outstanding warrant, issued while he or she was abroad. Or, it might be exercised in absentia but pursuant to an outstanding warrant, issued while a subsequently absconding accused was present in the prosecuting state. The fact is that prescription is logically independent of enforcement. On the one hand, there is universal jurisdiction, a head of prescriptive jurisdiction alongside territoriality, nationality, passive personality and so on. On the other hand, there is enforcement in absentia, just as there is enforcement in personam.
In turn, since prescription is logically distinct from enforcement, the legality of the latter can in no way affect the legality of the former, at least as a matter of reason. Universal jurisdiction to prescribe is either lawful or it is not. The issuance of a warrant in absentia and trial in absentia is either lawful or it is not. And, as far as international law goes, these last two are, in fact, lawful, in a reflection of the position classically adopted by the civil-law tradition. As rightly noted by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal:
. . . [s]ome jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is said that a person must be within the jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little to do with bases of jurisdiction recognized under international law.
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In short, as a matter of international law, if universal jurisdiction is permissible, then its exercise in absentia is logically permissible also. Whether it is desirable is, needless to say, a separate question.
Of course, logic and the opinio juris of states do not always go hand in hand, and it is always open to states to indicate unambiguously that the international lawfulness of universal jurisdiction does, in fact, depend upon the presence of the offender. But, 'the great majority of the interested states' 67 have not done so, to date. If the novel term 'universal jurisdiction in absentia' must be used at all, it can surely only be as shorthand (and potentially confusing shorthand, at that) for the combined manifestation in a given case of two distinct aspects of national criminal jurisdiction, namely the enforcement in absentia of universal prescriptive jurisdiction. If one is to talk, however, of 'universal jurisdiction in absentia', then one might as well talk also of territorial jurisdiction in absentia, nationality jurisdiction in absentia, passive personality jurisdiction in absentia, and so on. But no one does.
As for President Guillaume's more specific conclusion -based on the classic treaty undertaking by each state party to 'take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . .' -that the exercise in absentia of universal jurisdiction 'is unknown to international conventional law' 68 70 It is clear that the territorial precondition to the exercise of the mandatory universal jurisdiction envisaged in such treaty provisions is designed to take account of the general unavailability of trial in absentia among states of the common-law tradition. A conventional obligation to provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia would prevent these states from being able to ratify the conventions in question. In this light, the territorial precondition serves as a universally acceptable lowest common denominator, designed to encourage maximum participation in these treaties. 71 Moreover, as observed by Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, most of the international criminal conventions which contain this provision also embody a provision to the effect that the convention 'does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law'. 72 It is also worth recalling that the mandatory universal jurisdiction provision in question is accompanied, in every single instance, by an aut dedere aut judicare provision; 73 and, as remarked by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal:
. . . [t] here cannot be an obligation to extradite someone you choose not to try unless that person is within your reach. National legislation, enacted to give effect to these treaties, quite naturally also may make mention of the necessity of the presence of the accused. These sensible 74 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 57 (original emphasis). 75 Copy on file with author. 76 Arrest Warrant, sep. op. Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, at § 6. realities are critical for the obligatory exercise of aut dedere aut prosequi jurisdiction, but cannot be interpreted a contrario so as to exclude a voluntary exercise of a universal jurisdiction.
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In addition, it is not clear how these treaty provisions could have a bearing either way on the position of 'universal jurisdiction in absentia' under general international law.
There is an intriguing postscript to all of this. In the version of Arrest Warrant originally made available on the ICJ website, 75 the dissenting opinion of Judge Rezek contained an additional paragraph (a paragraph 8) when compared with the version now available electronically. In this excised paragraph, Judge Rezek distinguishes the case before the Court from the request made by Spain 'in absentia', as it were, for the extradition by the United Kingdom of Senator Augusto Pinochet for crimes committed in Chile against Spanish nationals -a request that Judge Rezek considers internationally lawful. In a further conflation of jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce, Judge Rezek concludes:
. . . et surtout . . . la compétence de la justice espagnole avait pour fondement le principe de la nationalité passive, qui peut justifier -bien que ce ne soit pas le cas de la totalité, peut-être même pas d'une majorité d'Etats -l'engagement de l'action pénale in absentia, donnant lieu de ce chef à l'émission d'un mandat d'arrêt international et à la demande d'extradition.
The reason for the paragraph's excision is a matter of surmise.
C. 'Classical' Universal Jurisdiction, 'True Universality', Universal Jurisdiction 'Properly So Called', 'Pure' Universal Jurisdiction, etc.
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant
Although recognizing that the legality of universal jurisdiction is unaffected by the method of its enforcement, the joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal is inconsistent in its use of the term 'universal jurisdiction' and seemingly unclear as to what it encompasses. This opacity, again, reflects a certain elision of prescription and enforcement, which is, in turn, a function of the judges' inattention to the moment at which the requisite prescriptive jurisdictional nexus must be present. The three judges observe at the outset:
As Mr Yerodia was a non-national of Belgium and the alleged offences described in the arrest warrant occurred outside of the territory over which Belgium has jurisdiction, the victims being non-Belgians, the arrest warrant was necessarily predicated on a universal jurisdiction.
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They then 'turn to the question whether States are entitled to exercise jurisdiction over persons having no connection with the forum State when the accused is not 77 Ibid., at § 19. 78 Ibid., at § 20. 79 See ibid. 80 Ibid., at § 21. 81 See ibid., at § 28. present in the State's territory', 77 and note, by way of preface, that, with the exception of the Belgian legislation in issue, 'national legislation, whether in fulfilment of international treaty obligations to make certain international crimes offences also in national law, or otherwise, does not suggest a universal jurisdiction over these offences '. 78 All of these illustrate the trend to provide for the trial and punishment under international law of certain crimes that have been committed extraterritorially. But none of them, nor the many others that have been studied by the Court, represent a classical assertion of a universal jurisdiction over particular offences committed elsewhere by persons having no relationship or connection with the forum State.
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Turning to national case law, the judges point to Dutch and German prosecutions:
23. In the Bouterse case the Amsterdam Court of Appeal concluded that torture was a crime against humanity, and as such an 'extraterritorial jurisdiction' could be exercised over a non-national. However, in the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court attached conditions to this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction (nationality, or presence within the Netherlands at the moment of arrest) on the basis of national legislation. 24. By contrast, a universal jurisdiction has been asserted by the Bavarian Higher Regional Court in respect of a prosecution for genocide (the accused in this case being arrested in Germany) . . ..
Next, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal survey the treaty law. They draw attention to the first 'grave breaches' provision, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and incorporated by reference into Additional Protocol I of 1977, which provides that 'Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed . . . grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts', 81 and they comment:
No territorial or nationality linkage is envisaged, suggesting a true universality principle . . .. 82 Ibid., at § 31. 83 See ibid., [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] at § 41. 85 Ibid., at § 42. 86 Ibid., at § 44. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., at § 45. 89 Ibid., at § 49. But a different interpretation is given in the authoritative Pictet Commentary . . ., which contends that this obligation was understood as being an obligation upon States parties to search for offenders who may be on their territory. Is it a true example of universality, if the obligation to search is restricted to their own territory? Does the obligation to search imply a permission to prosecute in absentia, if the search had no result?
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They also note the provision common to most international criminal conventions, discussed by President Guillaume and Judge Ranjeva, which requires each State Party to 'take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . .', or like formulation. 83 They state:
By the loose use of language [this] has come to be referred to as 'universal jurisdiction', though [it] is really an obligatory territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere.
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The judges make subsequent reference to 'this obligation (whether described as the duty to establish universal jurisdiction, or, more accurately, the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events)' 85 and to 'the inaccurately termed "universal jurisdiction principle" in these treaties '. 86 Turning to academic writings, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal refer to '[t] he assertion that certain treaties and court decisions rely on universal jurisdiction, which in fact they do not'. 87 Finally, summing up their findings, the judges declare:
That there is no established practice in which States exercise universal jurisdiction, properly so called, is undeniable. As we have seen, virtually all national legislation envisages links of some sort to the forum State; and no case law exists in which pure universal jurisdiction has formed the basis of jurisdiction.
88
They even make passing reference to 'universal criminal jurisdiction in absentia'.
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Discussion
The marked terminological inconsistency of Judge Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal is frustrating, and leaves the reader scarcely able to tell whether reference to 'universal jurisdiction' at any given point is to universal prescriptive jurisdiction, as such, or to universal prescriptive jurisdiction enforced without the offender's being present within the territory of the prescribing state. Perhaps even more to the point, the terminological distinctions drawn by the judges are less than sound. 'Universal jurisdiction', as emphasized already, is shorthand for universal jurisdiction to prescribe, and refers to the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances where 53. This brings us once more to the particular point that divides the Parties in this case: is it a precondition of the assertion of universal jurisdiction that the accused be within the territory? 54. Considerable confusion surrounds this topic, not helped by the fact that legislators, courts and writers alike frequently fail to specify the precise temporal moment at which any such requirement is said to be in play. Is the presence of the accused within the jurisdiction said to be required at the time the offence was committed? At the time the arrest warrant is issued? Or at the time of the trial itself? An examination of national legislation, cases and writings reveals a wide variety of temporal linkages to the assertion of jurisdiction. This incoherent practice cannot be said to evidence a precondition to any exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction. . . . It might be observed that if, as a precondition to the assertion of universal jurisdiction, the presence of the accused were required at the time the offence was committed, it would not be an assertion of universal jurisdiction at all, but a straightforward assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of territoriality.
no other lawful head of prescriptive jurisdiction is applicable to the impugned conduct at the time of its commission. The term applies irrespective of whether this prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised in personam or in absentia: just as prescription and enforcement are logically and legally distinct, so too are they terminologically independent of each other. Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal's references to 'classical' universal jurisdiction, 'true universality', universal jurisdiction 'properly so called' and 'pure' universal jurisdiction, when what they are in fact referring to is universal prescriptive jurisdiction exercised in absentia, are misplaced. Indeed, universal jurisdiction 'properly so called' is universal prescriptive jurisdiction tout court.
Similarly, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal characterize the common treaty provision obliging each State Party to 'take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences [in question] in cases where the alleged offender is present in its territory . . .' as a manifestation of 'the inaccurately termed "universal jurisdiction principle"' -also including under this rubric, by way of necessary implication, the Canadian Criminal Code's provision for jurisdiction in circumstances where 'at the time of the act or omission Canada could, in conformity with international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person on the basis of the person's presence in Canada', 90 as well as the exercise by the Dutch courts of jurisdiction in circumstances where the only link to the Netherlands is the arrest of the accused in Dutch territory. Such exercises of criminal jurisdiction are, the judges assert, really examples of 'territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed elsewhere' or, equally, of 'a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial events'. This terminology is unhelpful and, with respect, a trifle silly.
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In reality, these three exercises of jurisdiction are all manifestations of 'universal jurisdiction', viz. universal jurisdiction to prescribe: that is, at the time of the commission of the offence, no other accepted head of prescriptive jurisdiction need link the prescribing state to the offender. All that is required is that the offender subsequently be present (or, in the Dutch case, be arrested) in the territory of the prescribing state -and this is a limitation strictly as to enforcement. As such, the three examples all constitute exercises in personam of universal jurisdiction. To call them 'territorial jurisdiction' is to confuse the terminology of prescriptive jurisdiction with the separate concept of enforcement. Similarly, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal do not characterize as assertions of universal jurisdiction the Australian War Crimes Act (as amended) and the United Kingdom's War Crimes Act, both of which grant the courts jurisdiction over persons accused of certain crimes committed during the Second World War where those persons have subsequently become nationals or residents of Australia and the United Kingdom, respectively. But both Acts do, in fact, represent assertions of universal jurisdiction in that, at the time of the commission of the offence, no other accepted head of prescriptive jurisdiction need have existed. The criterion of subsequent nationality or subsequent residency is a criterion only as to the scope of permissible enforcement. In other words, these Acts are examples of universal jurisdiction, albeit enforced only as against perpetrators who, at the time of enforcement, are nationals or residents of the prescribing state. These Acts are not examples of prescriptive jurisdiction on the basis of nationality or residency. Indeed, the Australian government explicitly stated that it was providing for universal jurisdiction through the subsequent nationality and subsequent residency provisions of the War Crimes (Amendment) Act 1988 -a statement accepted in principle in the High Court of Australia.
92 Scholarly opinion has also characterized such provisions as manifestations of universal jurisdiction.
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In turn, neither the requirement of the offender's subsequent presence in the territory of the prescribing state nor the limitation as to his or her subsequent nationality or subsequent residency undermines the cogency of the above legislative and judicial examples -where not pursuant to a treaty obligation -as state practice in favour of the permissibility under general law of universal jurisdiction to prescribe in relation to the offences in question. In each case, the state in question clearly considers it permissible to assert criminal jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by persons who, at the time of commission, are non-resident aliens, in circumstances where such offences are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental interests of the prescribing state (nor even to give rise to effects within its territory). Indeed, it is no coincidence that, in each example, the jurisdiction in question was exercised or is provided for in respect of offences widely considered to give rise to universal jurisdiction under general international law -in the Dutch prosecution, in respect of a crime against humanity; in the Bavarian prosecution, genocide; and in the Australian, UK and Canadian legislation, customary war crimes. 94 In each of these examples, the restriction on the enforceability of the offence would seem to be largely political. As Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert remarks, speaking specifically of the requirement of the offender's subsequent presence in the territory:
. . . [i]t may be politically inconvenient to have such a wide jurisdiction because it is not conducive to international relations and national public opinion may not approve of trials against foreigners for crimes committed abroad. This does not, however, make such trials illegal under international law. 95 The same political considerations could be seen equally to underpin the requirement of subsequent nationality or subsequent residency. Given the Pinochet experience in relation to its more expansive enforcement of universal jurisdiction over torture, 96 such considerations almost certainly helped motivate the United Kingdom, when enacting the International Criminal Court Act 2001, to restrict the enforcement of the offences of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, when committed outside the United Kingdom by persons not, at that time, UK nationals, UK residents or persons subject to UK service jurisdiction, to the prosecution of those persons who subsequently become resident in the United Kingdom. 97 Indeed, the point about international relations was made in the devolved Scottish Parliament during the passage of the analogous International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001, where the spectre of 'political repercussions for Scotland' was raised. 98 Other compelling reasons for the restrictive enforcement of universal prescriptive jurisdiction would appear to be practical. As Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert again observes, referring once more specifically to the requirement of the offender's subsequent presence in the territory:
. . . [a] practical consideration may be the difficulty in obtaining the evidence in trials of extraterritorial crimes. Another practical reason may be that States are afraid of overburdening their court system . . .. The concern for a linkage with the national order . . . seems to be more of a pragmatic than of a juridical nature. It is not, therefore, necessarily the expression of an opinio juris . . .. 99 The need to avoid overburdening the courts was one explicit motivation behind the subsequent nationality and subsequent residency restrictions in the United Kingdom's War Crimes Act 1991; 100 and a similar desire not to become a 'global prosecutor', 101 along with reservations as to the practicability of evidence gathering, 102 were cited in debate in the Scottish Parliament over the jurisdictional provisions of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act. It should also be kept in mind when considering the requirement of the offender's subsequent presence in the territory that municipal law might stipulate this as a precondition for the criminal courts' exercise of jurisdiction. In sum, the circumscribed enforcement of universal prescriptive jurisdiction is not, without more, cogent evidence for an ambivalence on the part of states over the permissibility under general international law of the assertion of such jurisdiction in limine.
One important upshot of all this is that, when the assertion by states of so-called subsequent presence, subsequent nationality and subsequent residency jurisdiction over crimes under general international law is taken into account, there is more state practice to support the permissibility of universal jurisdiction over such offences than Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal -and, a fortiori, President Guillaume and
